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ABSTRACT
The increase of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere raises the average temperature of the planet, 
triggering problems that threaten the survival of humans. Protecting the global climate from the effects 
of climate change is an essential condition for sustaining life. For this reason, governments, scientists, 
and society are joining forces to propose better solutions that could well-rounded environmentally, 
social and economic development relationships. International climate change negotiations involve 
many countries in establishing strategies to mitigate the problem. Therefore, understanding 
international negotiation processes and how ratified agreements impact a country is of fundamental 
importance. The purpose of this paper is to systematize information about how climate negotiations 
have progressed, detailing key moments and results, analyzing the role that Brazil played in the course 
of these negotiations and the country’s future perspectives.
Keywords: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. Conference of the Parties. Sustainable Development. Low Carbon Agriculture.
RESUMO
O aumento dos gases de efeito estufa na atmosfera eleva a temperatura média do planeta, 
desencadeando problemas que ameaçam a sobrevivência do ser humano. A proteção do clima global 
frente aos efeitos das mudanças climáticas é uma condição essencial para a sustentação da vida. Por 
essa razão, governos, cientistas e a sociedade estão unindo forças para propor melhores soluções 
que possam agregar relações de desenvolvimento ambiental, social e econômico. As negociações 
internacionais sobre a mudança do clima envolvem muitos países no estabelecimento de estratégias 
para a mitigação do problema. Portanto, entender os processos internacionais de negociação e de que 
maneira os acordos ratificados impactam um país são de importância fundamental. O objetivo deste 
artigo é sistematizar informações sobre como as negociações têm procedido, detalhando momentos 
chave e os resultados, analisando o papel que o Brasil desempenhou no decorrer dessas negociações e 
as perspectivas futuras do País. 
Palavras-Chave: Painel Intergovernamental em Mudança do Clima. Convenção-Quadro das Nações 
Unidas sobre Mudança do Clima. Conferência das Partes. Desenvolvimento Sustentável. Agricultura de 
Baixo Carbono.
1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1988, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an intergovernmental body of the 
United Nations with the purpose of scientifically evaluating the possible socioeconomic and environmental 
impacts of climate change and formulating realistic strategies to deal with the problem (MIGUEZ, 2002). 
Their reports are essential to recognizing the effect of greenhouse gases (GHG) on the climate system. The 
first IPCC assessment report, AR1, was published in 1990 and featured work on two items: (a) evaluation 
of how developing countries could increase their participation and cooperation with IPCC work and (b) 
elements for implementing future work on international cooperation within the theme (IPCC, 1990).  
The Second World Climate Conference (WCC), held in Geneva in 1990, was the starting point for 
discussions on the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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(UNFCC) (hereinafter referred to as the Convention), a treaty between almost every country in the 
world setting the principles, norms, roles and cooperation between the parties for decision-making 
on climate change. The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the Convention was established 
in the same year at the United Nations General Assembly, and the participating countries signed 
the document at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio 92) in 1992 
(MENDES, 2014). Brazil was the first country to sign the agreement and had a significant presence in 
international environmental articulations and debates. 
The Convention that was implemented in 1994 convenes the participating countries once a year at the 
Annual Conference of the Parties (COP), which features discussions, debates, results, agreements, and 
decision-making on the challenges of economic development, environmental maintenance and social 
problems in the face of climate change (CENCI, 2020).
The Convention follows the principle of multilateralism, which is contained in the UN Charter, and 
considers that each signatory country is a party to the agreement (hence the term “Conference of 
the Parties”) and that any decision taken must be consensual, not determined by a simple majority of 
votes. Moreover, decisions are part of a global agreement of interest to all Parties. In the language of 
negotiation: “nothing is decided until everything is decided” (UNFCCC, 1992). 
For its time, considering the lack of full knowledge about the processes and impacts of climate change, 
the text of the Convention brought significant advances to the discussion of the environment. The 
Convention recognized, amongst other points, that (UNFCCC, 1992):
• Earth’s climate change and its adverse effects are a common concern of humanity;
• The largest share of global, historical and current emissions of greenhouse gases originates 
in developed countries;
• Per capita emissions from developing countries are still relatively low, and the share of 
global emissions from developing countries will grow so that they can meet their social 
and development needs.
Moreover, the ultimate objective was to “achieve stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 
1992, p4). The text further warned that such a level should be achieved within a sufficient period to 
enable ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, ensure that food production is not threatened, 
and enable economic development to proceed sustainably.
The Convention imposed a set of targets for GHG emission reductions for some countries, mainly the 
developed ones, listed in the Convention Annex I. The Convention did not impose initial emission 
reduction targets for developing and least developed countries (UNFCCC, 1992), because the developed 
countries accounted for most of the emissions, most of the concentration of gases in the atmosphere, 
and the rise in the average temperature of the planet. Further, Annex I listed countries were required 
to promote policies and measures for the reduction of emissions to reach the emission level of the year 
1990, a commitment that has not been achieved.
The Convention still contains two fundamental principles for the consolidation of international 
negotiation and sustainable development, especially in developing countries (UNFCCC, 1992):
• Precautionary Principle: Lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
countries to postpone measures to predict, prevent, or minimize the causes of climate 
change and mitigate its adverse effects.
• Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities: Parties shall protect the climate 
system for the benefit of present and future generations based on equity and following 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. In this regard, 
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developed country Parties should take the lead in addressing climate change and the 
adverse impacts of climate change.
The Convention, through the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, proposed a 
series of commitments common to all signatory Parties, such as:
• Preparation of a National Communication, containing the inventory of anthropogenic GHG 
emissions by gas and economic sector;
• Promotion of mitigation and adaptation programs;
• Development of technologies for emission reduction and prevention;
• Protection of carbon sinks, such as forests and oceans;
• Consideration of climate change in social, economic and environmental policies;
• Promotion of scientific research on climate change;
• Promotion of education, training and awareness actions.
A plethora of decisions and documents have been produced throughout the more than 20 years of 
negotiation. This paper will explore seven crucial moments that occurred during this extensive process 
of negotiations and future perspectives of Brazil’s role in international negotiations. In chronological 
order (Figure 1) we will present and discuss the main issues of the first COP and the Brazilian Proposal; 
the creation of the Kyoto Protocol; the Bali Action Plan; COP15 and Brazil’s voluntary commitment; 
COP21, the Paris Agreement and Brazil’s Nationally Determined Contribution; the Talanoa Dialogue 
and finally COP24 and the Katowice Climate Package.
Figure 1 | Chronological order of the international negotiations events for climate change.
Source: elaborated by the authors
2 MATERIAL AND METHODS
To conduct this research the method of literature review was used. First, fifteen key terms were defined 
for our topic: Climate change; International negotiations; Greenhouse gases; Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; Conference of the 
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Parties; Environmental maintenance; Challenges of economic development; Kyoto Protocol; Paris 
Agreement;  Brazil’s Nationally Determined Contribution; Talanoa Dialogue; Katowice Climate Package; 
Bali Action Plan and Low Carbon Agriculture Plan of National policy on climate change. 
Second, a systematic search was conducted using library catalogs, abstracts and reviews, citation 
indexes, bibliographies, websites and national and international journals. We restrict the search to 
Portuguese and English, focusing on literature between 1990 and 2018. The web-based search was 
proceeded using only seven websites: Google Scholar, Science Direct, Springerlink, Scielo, ERIC, Science.
gov, and ScienceResearch. 
For each website, we include items embracing thesis, scientific papers, books, book chapters, reviews, 
reports, and government documents. All documents were identified in three categories: i) broader 
documents, that is, documents that match one key term, but the scope is not related to climate theme 
or is not related to Brazil; ii) related documents, that is, documents that match key term and the 
theme embrace climate and Brazil; iii) narrower documents, that is, documents that exactly about 
International climate change negotiations involving Brazil. Finally, a list of 187 key references was 
obtained and 94 evaluated. As exclusion criteria, we exclude documents that are focusing mainly on 
the effects of climate on biophysical systems; documents that not included negotiations strategies, or 
are not clear; documents that not mention sustainable Brazil programs. 
3 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
3.1 COP1 AND THE BRAZILIAN PROPOSAL
The first COP was held in Berlin in 1995, after the actual implementation of the Convention in 1994. At 
that first meeting, it was already possible to identify that there existed an increase in GHG emissions 
and that the initial goal of emission reductions proposed for developed countries would be insufficient. 
The proposed solution was “jointly implemented activities”, presented in the document called the 
“Berlin Mandate” (Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate - AGBM).
At this COP, Brazil played an important role in presenting elements for a protocol in response to the Berlin 
Mandate, known as the “Brazilian Proposal”. This Proposal was a very innovative approach, and the document 
presented two elements to support discussion regarding the future negotiation process (UNFCCC, 1997): (a) 
the Proposal of objective criteria to establish the individual responsibility of Annex I countries in relation to 
the causes of the greenhouse effect; and (b) the idea of a Clean Development Fund.
This proposal assumed that the responsibility of each country should not be taken solely concerning 
its GHG emissions or its contribution to increasing the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere. 
Thus, as the higher concentrations of GHG in the atmosphere increase the planet’s temperature, 
the responsibility of each country must also be related to its contribution to the increase of global 
temperature. This difference in parameters implies that Annex I countries have made an even more 
significant contribution to the problem, as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Relative contribution allocated to each Party according to the First Report of the IPCC (1990). 
Source: adapted from FRONDIZI  (2009).
 
3.2 CREATION OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
The Brazilian proposal, in the first COP, was not entirely accepted by the developed countries (BRAZIL, 
2010), but it provided influential subsidies for international negotiations and was a precursor to the 
COP3 decision (in 1997) with the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, which conferring real regard to the 
human influence on climate (OPPENHEIMER et al., 2007). At the moment, Brazil start to emerge as a 
climate mitigation-wise country.
The Kyoto Protocol was the first legally binding agreement to reduce GHG emissions and created 
three important mechanisms for industrialized countries to meet their reduction targets; which are 
Emissions trading, Joint implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (MAAMOUN, 
2019; UNFCCC, 1998).
However, for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force, two requirements were necessary: (a) at least 
55 Convention countries would have to ratify the Protocol, and (b) the inclusion of Annex I countries 
representing at least 55% of total CO2 emissions in 1990 (UNFCCC, 1998). 
These requirements somehow embraced a twofold way and gave the US and Russia veto power, polarizing 
these countries again after the cold war, a kind of climate war. This is because if one of them did not ratify the 
agreement, the value of 55% of emissions would not be reached. The US did not accede to the agreement 
but made its participation conditional to any Convention protocol if commitments to limit and reduce GHG 
emissions were also made by developing countries in the same period. This a priori political US position 
seems to be intended to safeguard a privileged position in the global scenario, however, it may have been 
the key to the effectiveness of the protocol (MAAMOUN, 2019; MOSS et al., 2008).
An intense negotiation period followed until the US announced, in March 2001, that they would not 
ratify the Protocol. With that, the only way forward was to ensure Russia’s presence in the agreement, 
which was finally granted on November 4, 2004.
Since the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2004, there has been a significant change in the negotiation 
process resulting in “two tracks”: the Convention (Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action - AWG-LCA - ad hoc group for long-term dialogues for the implementation of the Convention) 
and the Kyoto Protocol (Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Committees for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol - AWG-KP - ad hoc group for establishing the Kyoto Protocol). Thus, the COP came to 
host a new modality of meeting: the COP/MOP, where the Conference of the Parties serves as the basis 
for the meeting of the Kyoto Protocol.
Maamoun (2019) assessed emissions data from countries committed to the Kyoto protocol and found 
that the protocol was a successful first step. The author noted that the protocol prevented a worse 
emission level from occurring even though leading countries in GHG emissions, such as the US, did not 
participate in the agreement.
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3.3 BALI ACTION PLAN
During the COP13 (2007) in Bali (Indonesia), the Bali Action Plan (BAP) was created to guide negotiations 
until COP15, when a new legally binding agreement was expected. The BAP was composed of negotiating 
areas, the main ones being: expanded international and national action on mitigation, expanded action 
on adaptation and expanded action on technology transfer and development (UNFCCC, 2008).
The expanded mitigation action negotiation area was subdivided into six areas: (i) mitigation in Annex 
I countries; (ii) mitigation in non-Annex I countries; (iii) reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation and maintain soil carbon stocks through forest management; (iv) market; (v) economic 
measures and (vi) social measures.
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation has the acronym REDD while reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, maintaining soil carbon stocks through forest 
management has the acronym REDD+. This area deserves attention, as it refers to a mechanism that 
allows compensation to those who maintain forests without deforestation, avoiding greenhouse 
gas emissions, plus conservation activities, sustainable forest management, and increased stocks in 
developing countries (ARTS; INGRAM; BROCKHAUS, 2019).
The BAP proposed to intensify mitigation measures under three premises (UNFCCC, 2008):
• Measurable, reported and verified (MRV) commitments or mitigation measures for each 
country, including quantified emission limitation and reduction targets, from all Annex 
I Parties, ensuring comparability between them and taking into account differences in 
national circumstances;
• Country-appropriate mitigation measures for non-Annex I Parties, in the context of 
sustainable development, with appropriate technological, financial and capacity support, 
to enable MRV requirements to be met;
• Approaches to cross-sectoral cooperation and sector-specific measures to improve 
implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1 (c) of the Convention, which is primarily 
measures to promote and cooperate with development including technology transfer and 
commitments that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic GHG emissions.
Developing countries do not have emission reduction targets. However, the BAP demanded that the 
implementation of the Convention were extended with nationally appropriate mitigation actions, leading 
to a substantial deviation of emissions from non-Annex I countries from the trend path. These actions were 
to be supported by Annex I countries in terms of financing, technology transfer, and capacity building.
Thus, Brazil has the following examples of mitigation actions (BRAZIL, 2010):
• Deforestation: further reduction of deforestation focusing on the Amazon and Cerrado;
• Energy: energy efficiency, increased use of biofuels, an increased supply of energy by 
hydropower, alternative sources of energy;
• Agriculture: recovery of degraded pastures, crop-livestock integration, no-tillage system, 
biological nitrogen fixation;
• Industry: increased reforestation area for coal production for the steel industry.
Brazil’s participation increased the significant effort to reduce emissions already made in the country 
in order to achieve a substantial slowdown in its emissions growth. According to the Brazilian view of 
the time, mitigation actions should not be a means of offsetting emissions from the Annex I countries, 
because it was an agreement under the Convention where there are no mandatory targets for developing 
countries, but a framework that guides developing countries in terms of mitigating climate change.
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Concerning broadened action on adaptation, the BAP takes into account international cooperation 
for the urgent implementation of adaptation measures to the adverse effects of climate change in 
developing and least developed countries. Also, for these countries, it provides for risk management 
and mitigation strategies, disaster reduction strategies, economic diversification to increase resilience 
and synergies between activities and processes as a way of supporting adaptation in a coherent and 
integrated manner (UNFCCC, 2008).
With respect to expanded action in technology transfer and development, the BAP aims to remove 
obstacles and provide financial resources, accelerate the diffusion and expansion of technology 
deployment as well as promoting cooperation between research and development (R&D) for current, 
new and innovative technologies (UNFCCC, 2008). 
3.4 COP15 AND THE BRAZILIAN VOLUNTARY COMMITMENT 
The Copenhagen Conference in 2009 (COP15) generated high expectations from the Parties, the world 
press and society. A new, broadly and legally binding agreement was expected to bring a “solution” to 
the problem of climate change. Under pressure from all sides, the COP presidency considered necessary 
to present a proposal. That was the moment the Copenhagen Accord was created.
The Copenhagen Accord presented legal and procedural problems that hindered its operation. It was 
prepared by 29 countries and had the direct participation of several Heads of State. Several parties 
formally rejected it based on various procedural irregularities denounced during the Conference. The 
main problem was the lack of consensus, which would be enough to make the Accord non-operational. 
The COP observed the rejection of the Accord expressed by some parties, becoming a document 
without legal value. Consequently, it is not part of the official architecture of the Convention and has 
been repeatedly challenged by the Parties that have rejected it (DIMITROV, 2010).
However, although the general outcome of COP15 was not as expected, for Brazil it was significant, 
especially for the agricultural sector. During COP15, Brazil made a voluntary commitment to reduce 
emissions, playing a crucial role in the negotiations and motivating other developing countries to send 
voluntary commitments as well. The Brazilian commitment foresees a reduction of 36.1% to 38.9% 
of projected emissions by 2020, thus avoiding the emission of about 1 billion tons of CO2 equivalent 
(tCO2e), which represents the most significant reduction effort on the planet (BRAZIL, 2010).
In late January 2010, Brazil submitted to the Convention Secretariat two reports ratifying mitigation 
actions appropriate to the national context that had been proposed in Copenhagen. It also expressed, 
with due caution, its accession to the Copenhagen Accord. The proposals presented in Copenhagen 
were internalized by Law 12.187/09, which instituted the National Policy on Climate Change.
In 2010, Sectoral Plans were created to achieve this voluntary commitment, among them the ABC 
(Low Carbon Agriculture) Plan. According to Rodrigues and Galvão (2018), the National Policy on 
Climate Change established institutions that would be responsible for the governance of an essentially 
environmental policy with direct connections to the performance of the Brazilian economy, as 
demanded by the Brazilian climate change policy.
3.5 COP21, THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND THE BRAZILIAN NDC 
Following the unmet expectations at COP15 and the hard work of regaining confidence in the multilateral 
process of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its signatory countries, 
COP21, which took place in Paris, had the mission to finally reach a legally binding global agreement 
that could meet the objective requirements of the Convention (MILKOREIT, 2019).
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Lower expectations from the press and civil society facilitated the process, and the outcome of the 
Conference was the Paris Agreement, which was opened for ratification in April 2016. The Parties to 
the Agreement reflected the original content of the Convention, seeking to achieve the goals guided by 
the principles, justice and common but differentiated responsibilities, and their respective capacities, 
according to their different national circumstances.
The Agreement was marked by recognizing the need to respond effectively to the threats of climate 
change, based on substantial scientific knowledge, and the need to identify which countries could be most 
affected by climate change and also the measures taken by them. Priority was placed on ensuring food 
security and eradicating hunger, defending and protecting food production systems from the negative 
impacts of climate change, as well as recognizing the importance of conserving and strengthening 
anticipated greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs (SHARMA; PAYAL, 2019). It was recognized that the 
adoption of sustainable lifestyles and sustainable consumption and production patterns will play an 
essential role in combating climate change, with developed countries taking the lead (UNFCCC, 2015).
By strengthening the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, this Agreement 
aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change in the context of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication efforts, including (UNFCCC, 2015):
I. To maintain the overall average temperature increase below 2°C above pre-industrial levels 
and to make efforts to limit this temperature increase to 1.5°C in relation to pre-industrial 
levels, recognizing that this would reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
II. To increase the capacity to adapt to the negative impacts of climate change and promote 
resilience to climate change and low GHG emissions in a way that does not threaten food 
production; and
III. To make financial flows compatible with a path towards low GHG emissions and resilient to 
climate change.
The adoption by consensus that the increase in global average temperature should not exceed 2°C was 
an essential complement to the central objective of the Convention. The limitations of using annual 
GHG emissions inventories and applying different metrics for gas equivalence were also identified. It 
has been shown that, for mitigation target-based policy monitoring, the Global Temperature Change 
Potential (GTP) metric is more appropriate than the Global Warming Potential (GWP) metric currently 
most commonly used in inventory and mitigation policy analysis (MENDES, 2014).
In the IPCC’s first assessment report, the GWP is proposed as a method for comparing the potential 
climate impact of different non-CO2 GHGs as a CO2 equivalent unit. However, the use of GWP does not 
explain the magnitude of climate change, and scientists have proposed GTP as an alternative measure to 
GWP to assess its potential impact on increasing planetary surface temperature (KUMARI et al., 2019).
Article 3 of the Agreement brings a new dimension to the action strategies of countries regarding the 
mitigation of GHG emissions, with measures more appropriate to the reality of each Party. However, 
it was recognized that countries of Annex I have greater participation in the status quo of the GHG 
emissions problem, and the difficulties that non-Annex I countries will encounter in achieving these 
reductions (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 22).
In this way, we return to the main objective of the Convention, which seeks to limit the rise in the 
average temperature of the planet in the short term through the immediate reduction of emissions from 
developed countries, and in the short to medium-long term for developing countries. Commitments to 
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reduce emissions by country or by block of countries (such as the European Union) must be notified to 
the Convention through “Nationally Determined Contributions” (NDC).
Brazil was the first country to ratify the Paris Agreement, presenting its NDC to reduce emissions. The 
delivery of this document before COP21 was intended to demonstrate Brazil’s goodwill with international 
negotiations and the signing of a legally binding agreement, in line with the Convention’s guidelines and 
principles. The initial document used the term “intended” (iNDC) because, at the time, it still depended 
on the ratification, acceptance or approval of the Paris Agreement, and could thus be adjusted.
In its iNDC, Brazil proposed actions to mitigate GHG emissions and actions for adaptation to the effects 
of climate change, as well as outlining ways to implement these actions in the country and other 
developing countries through South-South cooperation based on solidarity and shared priorities for 
sustainable development. In expanding cooperation initiatives to other developing countries, the area 
of resilient and low-carbon agriculture plays a prominent role (BRAZIL, 2015).
Regarding mitigation, Brazil committed to reducing GHG emissions by 37% below 2005 levels by 2025, 
in addition to a subsequent indicative contribution to reduce GHG emissions by 43% below 2005 levels 
by 2030. The reference year 2005 uses the emissions as calculated in the inventory in Brazil’s second 
communication to the UNFCCC, which was the official document lodged with the United Nations when 
the iNDC was announced on September 2015 (BRAZIL, 2015).
This reduction of emissions may occur throughout the national territory for the whole economy, 
including CO2, CH4, N2O, perfluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, and SF6. The metric adopted was the 
Global Warming Potential in 100 years (GWP-100) using IPCC AR5 values.
Among the mitigation actions presented by Brazil, the following stand out (BRAZIL, 2015):
I. Increase the share of sustainable bioenergy in the Brazilian energy matrix to approximately 
18% by 2030, expanding biofuel consumption, increasing ethanol supply, including increases 
in the share of advanced biofuels (second generation), and enlarging the share of biodiesel in 
the blend of diesel;
II. In the forest sector and in terms of land-use change, strengthen compliance with the Forest 
Code at the federal, state and municipal levels; strengthen policies and measures aimed at 
achieving zero illegal deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon by 2030 and offset GHG emissions 
from legal vegetation suppression by 2030; restore and reforest 12 million hectares of forest 
by 2030 for multiple uses; expand sustainable native forest management systems through 
georeferencing and traceability systems applicable to native forest management to discourage 
illegal and unsustainable practices;
III. In the energy sector, achieve an estimated 45% share of renewable energy in the energy 
matrix by 2030, including: expanding the use of renewable sources to between 28% to 33% by 
2030; expand domestic use of non-fossil energy sources by increasing the share of renewable 
energy (in addition to hydropower) in electricity supply to at least 23% by 2030, including wind, 
biomass and solar energy increases; achieve 10% efficiency gains in the electricity sector by 
2030;
IV. In the agricultural sector, strengthen the strategy for sustainable intensification in agriculture, 
including restoring an additional 15 million hectares of degraded pasture by 2030 and increasing 
by 5 million hectares the area with integrated crop-livestock-forest systems (ICLF) by 2030.
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This new commitment, in addition to the one proposed by Brazil at COP15, largely reinforces the 
consolidation of low carbon agriculture and, in particular, the recovery of degraded pastures and ICLF, 
as a real way to achieve sustainable intensification of agricultural production. These technologies 
contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, increase productivity and income, increase 
social benefits to producers and consolidate sustainable development.
3.6 TALANOA DIALOGUE
The Paris Agreement will only come into force in 2020. Thus, during the COP 23 held in Germany in 
2017, the Talanoa Dialogue was created with the aims to encourage UNFCCC signatory countries to 
strengthen their commitments to curb global warming during the period before 2020 (LESNIEWSKA; 
SIEGELE, 2018). The Talanoa Dialogue consists of an international platform where all countries can 
share their actions to combat climate change and thus exchange experiences.
Talanoa is a word used to reflect an inclusive, participatory, and transparent dialogue process in Fiji 
and other Pacific islands. Talanoa’s goal is to share stories, build empathy, and make wise decisions for 
the collective good. The Talanoa process involves the sharing of ideas, skills, and experiences through 
narrative (UNFCCC, 2018).
In Brazil, this inclusive dialogue process began on August 2, 2018, at an event called Talanoa Dialogue 
- Brazil, coordinated by the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Foreign Relations, with 
support from the World Bank. This event took place in Rio de Janeiro and was attended by more than 
30 representatives from different sectors (government, the private sector, academia, civil society, 
and rural settlement communities). Throughout the year 2018, several Talanoas occurred in Brazil, 
organized by different sectors of society.
3.7 KATOWICE CLIMATE PACKAGE
With the creation of the Paris Agreement at COP 21, the next step was to create a way to implement 
the Agreement. Thus, during the Conference of the Parties (COP24) in Katowice, Poland (2018), the 
parties adopted a package of guidelines for implementing the Paris Agreement, called the Katowice 
Climate Package. The main objective of the Package is to operationalize the climate change regime 
contained in the Paris Agreement.
The Katowice package includes (UNFCCC, 2019):
• The transparency mechanism, which details how to measure national efforts to 
operationalize the transparency framework jointly and the definition of how countries 
will provide information about their NDCs with their respective mitigation and adaptation 
actions;
• Guidelines related to the process of establishing new funding targets from 2025, based 
on the current goal of mobilizing $100 billion per year from 2020 to support developing 
countries, as well as guidelines to assess progress in the development and transfer of 
technology;
• Rules on how to update each country’s goals in five-year cycles, among other items.
Furthermore, the Climate Package emphasizes the urgent need to increase the mobilization of 
climate finance. On the other hand, issues such as the use of cooperative approaches and sustainable 
development mechanism, as set out in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, are still pending. The use of 
such a mechanism would allow countries to meet some of their national mitigation targets through 
the use of so-called “market mechanisms”. The idea of these market mechanisms is to provide flexible 
instruments to reduce the costs of mitigation actions, for example, through the use of carbon markets.
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Thus, the outcome document of COP24 underscores the importance of strengthening countries 
responsibility in replenishing the impact of programs of the Global Environment Facility. It also requests 
that the Global Environment Facility ensures that its policies and procedures relating to the consideration 
and review of funding proposals are duly and efficiently followed up. Further, the document looks 
forward to the planned delivery of reductions in GHG emissions in the seventh replacement period, 
which is double than foreseen for the sixth replacement period.
For some critics, from a climate point of view, Katowice failed (OBSERVATÓRIO DO CLIMA, 2019). For 
them, the Package failed to adequately capture the sense of urgency communicated by science about 
action against climate chaos. Also, it left in the hands of the individual countries any decision on how 
to use this information. For Patricia Espinosa, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, Katowice was a 
success: “The result of Katowice is a breakthrough that all governments can be proud of! It strengthens 
the Paris Accord and opens the door to implementing climate action around the world!” (UNITED 
NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, 2019).
4 FUTURE PERSPECTIVES OF BRAZIL IN CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS
The world went through the industrial race and countries like England, France and Germany came out 
ahead. In a second moment, we had a technological race, for example, the space race and advances 
in computing. Since the 1990s, there has been an increase in environmental concern, which is linked 
to sustainable production. This fact paved the way for environmental protagonism in the world. 
However, there is no environmental power yet. There is still no country that is promoting sustainable 
development by aligning environmental preservation, that’s because big challenges must be faced and 
cooperation between the countries is essential. 
Some authors argue for the possibility of economic development and environmental preservation 
through strategic decision-making among government agencies, industry players, and non-governmental 
organizations following the Sustainable Development Goals developed by the ONU (OPOKU, 2019). 
However, other authors raise the issue that sustainable development prioritizes economic development 
and will inevitably cause damage to environmental preservation. 
These authors argue that the path to environmental preservation would be an economic downturn 
through an awareness of society concerning the high consumption, aiming at the search for social 
equity and human well-being (SANDBERG; KLOCKARS; WILÉN, 2019). However, from this discussion, 
questions emerge that still have no answer. Will current or future technology be able to increase 
productivity and preserve the environment to optimal limits? Nevertheless, would not a greater 
awareness of society and a quest for social equality be an essential pillar of sustainable development? 
Thus, a possible solution would be in the middle path, which is a balance between the social, economic, 
and environmental aspects.
A descriptive analysis conducted by Sforna (2019) shows that most developing countries demonstrates a 
willingness to actively contribute to climate change mitigation in cooperation with developed countries. 
However, external support requirements in the form of technology transfer, training, and financial 
support are paramount for these countries. At the same time, the author shows that the demand for 
climate finance from developing countries is higher than the current supply from developed countries 
and that trying to fill this gap is one of the critical challenges to controlling GHG emissions and thus 
reducing the catastrophic effects of climate change.
Brazil, however, is a country that has a higher potential to assume the role of great green power on the 
planet, especially when it comes to agriculture and biodiversity. Regarding agriculture development, 
environmental, and biodiversity protection, some countries, especially Brazil, have the opportunity 
to be future agri-environmental world potency. This opportunity is significant, as countries like Brazil 
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will no longer achieve the technological status of developed countries. Thus, there is an opportunity 
for Brazil’s agri-environment role in the world, but this will make future negotiations much more 
complicated and force the government to act intelligently.
In the last 45 years, Brazil has consolidated itself as a significant agricultural power. Grain production 
grew more than fivefold, while the planted area increased by only 60%. However, the most significant 
boost has occurred since 1990, partly due to the growth in exports, which have become the driving 
force of recent growth in Brazilian agribusiness. The country is currently the leading exporter of orange 
juice, coffee, pulp and paper, chicken meat, soy complex, and the second largest exporter of sugar and 
corn (USDA, 2017).
The total area of land occupied and in use in Brazil is approximately 30%, while Permanent Preservation 
Areas (indigenous lands and protected areas) and areas of native vegetation on private properties, 
separated according to environmental legislation—such as Legal Reserve - represent almost 50% of the 
Brazilian territory. If added to the native vegetation in unregistered lands, this percentage reaches 66%. 
Crops and planted forests occupy only 9% of the territory; planted pastures 13%; and native ones 8% 
(MIRANDA, 2017). On the other hand, from January 2019, with the new Brazilian government of Jair 
Bolsonaro, satellite data from Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE) show a significant 
increase in Amazon deforestation and an expansion of the exploratory agricultural frontier (KAMIMURA; 
SAUER, 2019). This increase in deforestation is related to the President’s aggressive discourse and 
policies for economic development by promoting agriculture and mining on protected lands (ESCOBAR, 
2019). Not surprisingly, the current government denies that humans have a direct impact on climate 
change and elects a foreign minister who believes global warming is an “invention of Marxist ideology” 
(FERRANTE; FEARNSIDE, 2019).
The president’s policies loosen legislation and weaken institutions that help fight deforestation, as well 
as the participation of civil society and NGOs concerned with environmental preservation (RODRIGUES 
et al., 2019). A clear example is the flexibility of the forest code by President Bolsonaro and the Minister 
of Agriculture, Tereza Cristina Dias, which includes a longer deadline for ruralists to restore natural 
vegetation in illegally deforested areas (FERRANTE & Fearnside, 2019). 
Besides, the new minister Ricardo Salles, very close to the ruralists and condemned for altering an 
environmental plan to benefit the companies (PEREIRA; VIOLA, 2019), extinguished the Secretariat of 
Climate Change and Forests, early in the government. This fact has impacted Brazil’s relationship with 
project donor countries, such as Norway and Germany, and has shaken international relations and the 
execution of important projects and partnerships, such as the Amazon Fund. These political decisions 
drastically affect Brazil’s role in the fight against deforestation and environmental preservation, which 
are fundamental for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
No other country in the world, not even the major agribusiness players, has the same conditions as 
Brazil to advance sustainable food production in the coming decades, and the governments must 
understand this position. The old idea of agricultural expansion through advancement in forested areas 
must be abandoned in favor of more integrated agriculture. Countries like China are already preparing 
to dominate the world agri-environment scenario in a clear vision of true patriotism, which implies 
protecting their people and dialoguing with the rest of the world for political empowerment (GUAN, 
2019; LIU et al., 2015).
Meanwhile, Brazil, which has agri-environmental technology and a biodiverse landscape to assume 
this scenario, is still assuming a light idea of patriotism and betting on the old bankrupt commodity 
model. The danger of this nationalism so defended by the current Brazilian government, as well as 
other countries in the world, is worrying as it leads to separation, war, and conflict, while the practical 
solution to the challenges of climate change lies in cooperation between countries. No country can 
solve climate change issues on its own. Extreme nationalism, therefore, limits humanity’s ability to deal 
with the current and future challenges the planet will face (HARARI, 2018).
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Brazil has a structure of science and innovation that has recently produced an unprecedented revolution 
in the rural zone, as well as farmers that are creative, enterprising and sensitive in incorporating new 
technologies into production. Pasture area which functions below its productive capacity still occurs, 
which represents room for growth in production and productivity, without opening new productive 
areas (EMBRAPA, 2018).
Thus, it is clear that Brazil’s significant competitive advantage in the international scenario for the 
next decade is sustainable development, combining efficient agricultural production and preservation 
of natural environments. Since 2009, Brazil has taken on a massive role in this agenda, when it made 
voluntary commitments to reduce GHG emissions and adapt to climate change. Brazil’s position in the 
negotiation motivated other developing countries to submit voluntary commitments. 
The proposals presented in Copenhagen were internalized in the National Policy on Climate Change. 
In 2010, in order to achieve this commitment Sector Plans were created, including the Low Carbon 
Agriculture Plan (ABC Plan, from the acronym in Portuguese). In addition to Copenhagen, in 2015, 
Brazil submitted to the UNFCCC its intended Nationally Determined Contribution (iNDC), in the context 
of negotiations on a protocol, other legal instruments, or outcomes legally agreed upon under the 
Convention, applicable to all Parties. 
This new commitment, made in addition to the one proposed by Brazil at COP15, reinforces the 
consolidation of low carbon agriculture and, in particular, the recovery of degraded pastures and ICLF 
as a real way to achieve the sustainable intensification of agricultural production. These technologies, 
beyond their ability to contribute to the mitigation of GHG emissions, may have the potential to increase 
productivity, income, and social benefits to farmers and consolidate sustainable rural development 
(RODRIGUES et al., 2019).
5 CONCLUSIONS
Following the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, in 2009, Brazil made a voluntary commitment to reduce 
GHG emissions and, with the Paris Agreement in 2016, a new commitment to further reduce GHG 
emissions in some sectors. It is noteworthy that both the voluntary commitment made at COP15 and 
the commitment made at COP21 through the NDCs are not actions linked to the commitment of Annex 
I countries to the Kyoto Protocol. All actions reported in this paper have demonstrated not only Brazil’s 
commitment to contribute to the negotiations under the Convention, but also its interest in making 
the country’s economy a world reference, based on the sustainable use of its natural resources and 
optimization processes involving all sectors of the economy.
Since the founding of the UNFCCC during Rio 92, Brazil has shown immense leadership in international 
negotiations and gained respect from all parties. All this effort has shown Brazil’s commitment and 
prominent role in promoting actions to reduce global warming and the development of a more 
sustainable economy.
However, this scenario is already change dramatically with the new policies and decision-making of the 
current government, which took office in 2019. Current political leaders deny the anthropic impacts on 
global climate change and weaken institutions that promote environmental preservation and oversee 
the deforestation. 
While most emissions are the responsibility of developed countries, the countries that will be most 
affected by the catastrophic consequences of climate change are developing and underdeveloped 
countries. So as long as the current government does not leverage the actions proposed by the climate 
change mitigation agenda, the country’s economic development is doomed to failure.
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Future challenges, given population growth, the effects of climate change, technological advances, 
and inequality in income distribution and concentration, significantly increase the importance of 
international negotiation and effective mechanisms for regulating the planet’s climate. For this to 
happen, it is necessary to establish a new economic model, giving up the extreme nationalism advocated 
by the current Brazilian government.
Therefore, Brazil’s consolidation as the world’s first green energy (in agriculture and environmental 
preservation) must be worked on as a country, not as a government agenda.
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